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ONLINE THREATS: THE DIRE NEED FOR A 
REBOOT IN TRUE-THREATS JURISPRUDENCE 
John Sivils* 
Free speech protection ends where true threats begin.1 The Supreme Court of 
the United States has defined “true threats” as “those statements where the 
speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act 
of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.”2 However, 
the Court has not meaningfully expounded on the true-threats doctrine since 
Black, leaving federal circuits split on the meaning of intent in a true-threat 
analysis.3 State high courts have further muddled the intent question in true-
threats jurisprudence by adopting analytical standards that differ from the federal 
appellate circuits in which they sit.4 
The First, Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits apply an 
objective test, asking how the alleged threat would be construed by either a 
reasonable speaker or a reasonable listener.5 The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits also 
apply an objective test but do not consider the perspective of the speaker or 
listener.6 Conversely, the Ninth and Tenth Circuits evaluate whether the speaker 
had subjective intent to intimidate a person or group of persons,7 with the Ninth 
Circuit further specifying that some threat statutes require both an objective and 
subjective analysis while others only require a subjective analysis.8 
Within this milieu, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Knox 
correctly upheld the criminal conviction of Pittsburgh rapper Jamal Knox for 
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 1. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003). 
 2. Id. 
 3. United States v. Clemens, 738 F.3d 1, 2–3 (1st Cir. 2013). 
 4. See Clay Calvert et. al., Rap Music and the True Threats Quagmire: When Does One Man’s Lyric 
Become Another’s Crime?, 38 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1, 10–11 (2014). 
 5. Commonwealth v. Knox, 190 A.3d 1146, 1163 (Pa. 2018) (Wecht, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. at 1163–64. 
 8. United States v. Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d 1113, 1117 (9th Cir. 2011). 
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terroristic threats and witness intimidation based solely on Knox’s rap song.9 The 
Commonwealth brought these charges against Knox after Pittsburgh police 
officers scheduled to testify against Knox discovered a music video titled “F--k the 
Police” posted on Facebook.10 The first verse of the song, sung by Knox, featured 
violent statements directed at Pittsburgh Detective Daniel Zeltner and Police 
Officer Michael Kosko.11 Knox’s specific mention of Zeltner and Kosko appeared 
motivated by the officers’ recent arrest of Knox for drug-related crimes.12 
In a bench trial, the trial court rejected Knox’s argument that his rap song was 
constitutionally protected speech on the grounds that the song was a true threat 
falling outside the scope of First Amendment protection.13 Knox appealed to the 
Superior Court of Pennsylvania, which affirmed on the issue of Knox’s intent to 
threaten but did not conduct a true-threat analysis.14 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted Knox’s appeal to address whether 
the music video had any First Amendment protection.15 Although the court 
correctly found that Knox intended to threaten or intimidate at least Zeltner and 
Kosko,16 it incorrectly stated that it was adopting a purely subjective test for 
intent.17 Moreover, the court’s holding that Black “allows states to criminalize 
threatening speech which is specifically intended to terrorize or intimidate”18 does 
not give lower courts any guidance on whether a high-level mens rea, such as 
specific intent, is required to keep a speech-restricting statute from running afoul 
of the First Amendment, or whether a lower mens rea, such as recklessness or 
knowing, suffices. 
After giving an overview of the Supreme Court’s two main cases on true 
threats—Watts v. United States19 and Virginia v. Black—and explaining the current 
circuit split on the issue of intent,20 the court stated that Black required an 
“inquiry into the speaker’s mental state”21 and a weighing of the contextual factors 
laid out in Watts.22 The court understood its consideration of contextual factors 
as a means of interpreting the speaker’s subjective intent.23 Through this lens, the 
court first considered the lyrics of the song and the sound effects in the music to 
find that the music video was threatening and that directing threats to officers by 
 
 9. Knox, 190 A.3d at 1161 (majority opinion). 
 10. Id. at 1150. 
 11. Id. at 1149. 
 12. Id. at 1159. 
 13. Id. at 1151. 
 14. See id. at 1151–52 (citing Commonwealth v. Knox, No. 1136 WDA 2014, 2016 WL 
5379299, at *5 (Pa. Super. Ct. Aug. 2, 2016) (slip op.)). 
 15. Id. at 1152. 
 16. See id. at 1160–61. 
 17. See id. at 1156–57. 
 18. Id. at 1158. 
 19. See id. at 1155 (“The true-threat doctrine has its genesis in the Watts case.”); see also Watts v. 
United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969) (per curiam) (“What is a threat must be distinguished from 
what is constitutionally protected speech.”). 
 20. See Knox, 190 A.3d at 1155–56. 
 21. Id. at 1157. 
 22. Id. at 1159. 
 23. See id. 
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name in the song evinced Knox’s subjective intent to threaten those officers.24 
In its Watts analysis, the court considered the conditionality of the threats, 
whether the threatened officers had reason to believe that Knox was capable of 
engaging in violence, how the officers reacted to the threats, and whether the 
threats were communicated directly to the officers.25 The court found that the 
threats were unconditional, that the presence of a gun at Knox’s recent arrest gave 
the officers reason to believe that Knox was capable of engaging in violence, that 
the officers reacted to the music video by relocating and leaving the police force, 
and that the posting of the video online was the equivalent of communicating 
directly to the officers.26 Before stating its holding, the court mentioned possible 
concerns of criminalizing artistic speech, especially in a genre pervaded by violent 
language.27 Despite these valid concerns, the court found that calling out officers 
by name and referencing a recent altercation with those officers took Knox’s rap 
song out of the artistic realm and into the realm of true threats.28 Thus, the court 
affirmed Knox’s conviction29 and expressly declined to clarify the necessary mens 
rea to sustain a true-threat conviction.30 
Although the majority’s failure to clarify all aspects of the true-threats doctrine 
might have been prudent in this case,31 this type of minimalism has “thwarted the 
advancement and coherence of First Amendment doctrine.”32 Despite the fact 
that the true-threats doctrine “screams out the loudest for clarification” above all 
other First Amendment doctrines,33 the Supreme Court of the United States 
explicitly refused to address any First Amendment concerns in its most recent 
foray into true-threats jurisprudence in Elonis v. United States.34 Moreover, the 
Court’s holding regarding the mens rea required to result in criminal punishment—
that a negligence standard would not suffice—only applies in the context of a 
specific federal statute criminalizing true threats.35 Since the Court found that the 
statute at issue criminalized specific intent to threaten, it pointedly refused to be 
the first court to consider whether a recklessness mens rea could be punished.36 
This minimalist approach, which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court followed in 
Knox, leaves lower courts without an analytical framework to determine the mens 
rea required for analogous state statutes criminalizing certain speech. As a result, 
 
 24. Id. at 1159–60. 
 25. Id. at 1160. 
 26. Id. at 1159–60. 
 27. See id. at 1160 (citing Andrea L. Dennis, Poetic (In)Justice? Rap Music Lyrics as Art, Life, and 
Criminal Evidence, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1, 23 (2007)). 
 28. Id. at 1160–61. 
 29. Id. at 1161. 
 30. See id. at 1157 n.10. 
 31. See id. at 1162 (Wecht, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 32. Clay Calvert & Matthew D. Bunker, Fissures, Fractures & Doctrinal Drifts: Paying the Price in 
First Amendment Jurisprudence for a Half Decade of Avoidance, Minimalism & Partisanship, 24 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 943, 950–51 (2016). 
 33. Id. at 957. 
 34. 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2012 (2015) (“Given our disposition, it is not necessary to consider any 
First Amendment issues.”). 
 35. Id. at 2011 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2012)). 
 36. Id. at 2013. 
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true-threats jurisprudence continues to become more muddled with each new 
case. 
Despite the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s failure to use Knox to clarify the 
question of mens rea in a subjective true-threat analysis for Pennsylvania courts, 
the court correctly found that the United States Supreme Court’s holding in 
Virginia v. Black mandated a subjective inquiry into the speaker’s mind.37 While 
some criticize the subjective-intent approach on the grounds that it puts a greater 
burden on the prosecution,38 an increased burden in itself is not facially 
undesirable. Heightening the burden necessary to regulate pure speech would 
help ensure that civil tort standards, such as negligence, do not creep into criminal 
jurisprudence,39 especially in an area as sensitive as regulation of speech. Such a 
prosecutorial burden in the regulation of speech falls in line with the general 
requirement of criminal law that the accused must have a culpable mens rea.40 
Additionally, the heightened subjective burden would promote the Black Court’s 
philosophy that “the hallmark of the protection of free speech is to allow ‘free 
trade in ideas’—even ideas that the overwhelming majority of people might find 
distasteful or discomforting.”41 A purely objective test would favor this 
“overwhelming majority” by disregarding the speaker’s interest in communicating 
freely, however crude her method of doing so might be.42 
Requiring the highest level of mens rea—specific intent to threaten—would not 
offend the objectives of criminal law in light of First Amendment concerns. Justice 
Wecht’s concurring and dissenting opinion in Knox accurately points out that 
punishing speech, even true threats, is an exception to the general First 
Amendment prohibition against regulating content of speech.43 Such regulations 
must be narrowly drawn.44 The less rigorous the mens rea standard, the more likely 
the regulation is not narrowly drawn. Thus, a heightened mens rea standard would 
rein in government imposition of content-based restrictions. 
Although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court purported to undertake only a 
subjective inquiry into the speaker’s intent,45 the court implicitly applied an 
objective, reasonable-listener test as well through its incorporation of contextual 
factors in the intent analysis.46 The court noted that these contextual factors 
include “whether the victim had reason to believe the speaker had a propensity to 
engage in violence, and how the listeners reacted to the speech.”47 The court 
 
 37. Commonwealth v. Knox, 190 A.3d 1146, 1156–57 (Pa. 2018). 
 38. Paul T. Crane, Note, “True Threats” and the Issue of Intent, 92 VA. L. REV. 1225, 1273 (2006). 
 39. P. Brooks Fuller, Evaluating Intent in True Threats Cases: The Importance of Context in Analyzing 
Threatening Internet Messages, 37 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 37, 47 (2015). 
 40. Id. at 45–46; see also Calvert & Bunker, supra note 32, at 60. 
 41. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003) (quoting Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 
616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)). 
 42. Crane, supra note 38, at 1272. 
 43. Commonwealth v. Knox, 190 A.3d 1146, 1164 (Pa. 2018) (Wecht, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). 
 44. Id. (citing Chaplinksy v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942)). 
 45. See id. at 1157–58 (majority opinion). 
 46. See id. at 1158. 
 47. Id. at 1159 (quoting J.S. ex. rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 858 (Pa. 
2002), abrogated by Knox, 190 A.3d at 1146). 
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found that the presence of a firearm at the scene of Knox’s prior arrest for drug 
charges was relevant in determining whether the officers had reason to believe 
that Knox would actually engage in violence.48 Stated differently, the court 
considered how the officers as reasonable listeners would interpret Knox’s 
statements in the music video in light of the gun’s presence at the scene of his 
recent arrest. This analysis shows that the court not only considered Knox’s 
mental state in delivering speech but also how such speech would be viewed by a 
reasonable listener under the relevant circumstances. 
The court further injected objective, reasonable-listener standards into its 
contextual analysis by emphasizing the way the officers reacted to the video. The 
court noted that the officer who discovered the video “did not see it as mere satire 
or social commentary”49 and that Zeltner and Kosko undertook drastic measures 
to ensure their own safety, such as resigning from the police force, moving to new 
residences, and obtaining security details.50 The court also pointed to evidence 
from the song’s lyrics that one of Knox’s friends warned against publishing the 
song,51 showing that other listeners believed the statements to be legitimate 
threats. Although the court did not expressly state that a reasonable listener’s 
understanding of the speech matters for its analysis, it nonetheless considered the 
listeners’ interpretation of the music video. Notably, the court also gave much 
weight to the actual effect the speech had on the officers,52 reflecting the idea that 
criminal punishment generally should stand only if the victim suffers actual 
harm.53 In this case, as in all true-threats cases, the harm suffered by the listeners 
was the fear of violence.54 Clearly, consideration of both a reasonable listener’s 
understanding of speech as well as the objective effect of speech on the actual 
listeners permeated the court’s analysis under the guise of contextual factors. 
In conducting their analyses, both the majority in Knox and Justice Wecht gave 
some consideration to the peculiarities of the medium of communication—rap 
music.55 The majority did not provide much in-depth analysis regarding rap56 but 
did recognize characteristics of the genre that should be taken into account in 
analyzing this type of communication.57 The majority concluded, however, that 
Knox’s calling out of officers by name and the reference to Knox’s recent arrest 
 
 48. Id. at 1160. 
 49. Id. at 1159. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 1158. 
 52. See id. at 1160–61. 
 53. See generally Stephen J. Schulhofer, Harm and Punishment: A Critique of Emphasis on the Results 
of Conduct in the Criminal Law, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1497 (1974). 
 54. Crane, supra note 38, at 1269–70 (citing R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 
(1992)). 
 55. See Motion for Leave to File Brief as Amici Curiae and Brief of Amici Curiae Michael 
Render (“Killer Mike”) et al. in Support of Petitioner at 17–19, Knox v. Commonwealth, 139 S. Ct. 
1547 (2019) (No. 18-949), 2019 WL 1115837, at *17–19 (expounding on these peculiarites), cert. 
denied, 139 S. Ct. at 1547. 
 56. For more on the history of rap and the genre’s interactions with the American legal system, 
see ERIK NIELSON & ANDREA L. DENNIS, RAP ON TRIAL: RACE, LYRICS, AND GUILT IN AMERICA 
59–74 (2019). 
 57. See Knox, 190 A.3d at 1160; see also NIELSON & DENNIS, supra note 56, at 48–58 (discussing 
elements of rap music critical to properly analyzing the genre). 
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removed the lyrics from the realm of fiction into autobiography.58 Although it can 
be difficult to distinguish between true threats and fictional grandstanding in a 
genre laden with over-the-top violent imagery, the majority’s reliance on the 
personal nature of the song provides a logically sound line between fictional 
puffery and factual threats. 
Another contextual aspect of the medium the court did not adequately analyze 
is that Knox’s music video was posted online, not sent directly to the Pittsburgh 
police. Online speech differs primarily from in-person speech due to 
decontextualization that occurs when the communication is not experienced in a 
social setting.59 Although the effect this difference should have on the analysis is 
outside the scope of this note, courts should at least consider the fundamental 
peculiarities of Internet communications in a true-threat analysis due to the 
development of online speech avenues. Internet use has exploded since Black,60 
which did not consider Internet communication at all. As cases regarding 
threatening Internet speech proliferate,61 courts will need to resist judicial 
minimalism and adapt Black to the modern age. 
One concern is that Internet communications are often not directed at the 
subject of the communication—or at anyone for that matter—yet are still viewed 
by millions. For example, tweets do not necessarily have to be directed at anyone 
in particular. In fact, most social media sites do not require communications to 
be directed at anyone. Both the majority and Justice Wecht in Knox pointed to 
the public accessibility of the music video as sufficient to find that Knox intended 
for the named law enforcement officers to see the video.62 Although such a 
conclusion may be warranted, it is troubling that the court provides almost no 
analysis on this issue. This conclusion reeks of strict liability, which has no place 
in the criminalization of speech. The aforementioned concern of requiring greater 
protection for speech regulations would seem to necessitate a stricter showing of 
directly communicating a threat to the recipient, especially since common sense 
would indicate that threatening speech delivered online, however extreme, is 
much less likely to intimidate a reasonable listener who is not interacting face-to-
face with the speaker. 
Although the majority of courts do not apply both objective and subjective 
analyses in all true-threats cases, some legal scholarship argues for an objective and 
subjective analysis of Internet communication.63 The dual analysis proposed 
herein, however, should not apply exclusively to Internet communications. 
Rather, this dual analysis can accomplish much more than merely contextualizing 
threatening communication. This approach would ensure the most equitable 
 
 58. See Knox, 190 A.3d at 1159–61. 
 59. Fuller, supra note 39, at 53. 
 60. See Andrew Perrin & Maeve Duggan, Americans’ Internet Access: 2000–2015, PEW RES. CTR. 
(June 26, 2015), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2015/06/26/americans-internet-access-
2000-2015/ [https://perma.cc/WP6T-64MC]. 
 61. Fuller, supra note 39, at 49. 
 62. Knox, 190 A.3d at 1160; id. at 1168–69 (Wecht, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
 63. See, e.g., G. Robert Blakey & Brian J. Murray, Threats, Free Speech, and the Jurisprudence of the 
Federal Criminal Law, 2002 B.Y.U. L. REV. 829, 1076–77; Fuller, supra note 39, at 75. 
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balancing of interests as to any type of speech. The chief interests at issue, 
recognized by both legal scholars and judges, include an individual’s autonomy 
interest to form thoughts and beliefs for himself or herself free of government 
interference64 and the listener’s interest in being free from the fear of violence.65 
The dual analysis would compel courts to highly scrutinize regulations of speech 
and lead to a thoughtful balancing of these interests. 
While some propose leaving the entire analysis exclusively in the hands of 
judges,66 such an approach would doubtless lead to further muddying of true-
threats jurisprudence. If the question of whether certain speech is a true threat is 
left to juries, courts would only need to ensure that juries receive proper 
instructions, which would require findings on the speaker’s subjective intent, the 
objective effect on a reasonable listener, and the actual effect on the actual 
listener. If the question is left to courts, then courts will be required to develop 
methods of analyzing facts, which would open more avenues for division among 
circuits and states as to how certain facts should be interpreted by judges. 
Although submitting the question of whether certain speech is a true threat to 
juries may lead to divergent outcomes (i.e., different juries could come to different 
findings based on the same set of facts), it would at least lead to consistent 
application of the law. Thus, on review, appellate courts could defer to district 
courts’ findings of fact in true-threats cases, ensuring a clear line between 
adjudication of law and finding of fact. 
In cases of threats made online as allegedly artistic speech, as in Knox, courts 
must further refine their jury instructions to require findings on the specificity of 
threats. Courts must also admit evidence for juries to consider regarding the 
peculiarities of the artistic genre at issue, as well as the peculiarities of speech 
communicated on the Internet. Such evidence would be most relevant in an 
objective analysis. 
Between the majority’s and Justice Wecht’s opinions in Knox, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court provided the optimal framework to analyze true threats in the 
context of artistic speech posted online. As expressly detailed by Justice Wecht 
and implicitly adopted by the majority, the question of intent to threaten should 
consider the speaker’s subjective intent, a reasonable listener’s objective 
interpretation of the communication, and the objective effect of the 
communication on the actual listener.67 The subjective analysis should require 
the prosecution to prove specific intent to threaten, the highest mens rea, to ensure 
that content-based speech regulations are kept narrow so as to respect the 
autonomy of speakers and listeners to engage in conversation without 
interference.68 The objective analysis will ensure that speakers are not punished 
for speech that would not have reasonably resulted in harm and did not in fact 
 
 64. Leslie Kendrick, Free Speech and Guilty Minds, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1255, 1279 (2014). 
 65. Crane, supra note 38, at 1270. 
 66. E.g., Blakey & Murray, supra note 63, at 1052 (arguing that judges are more neutral and 
more sensitive to First Amendment concerns than juries). 
 67. See Knox, 190 A.3d at 1165 (Wecht, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing J.S. 
ex. rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 858 (Pa. 2002), abrogated by Knox, 190 A.3d 
at 1146). 
 68. See id. 
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result in harm. In both instances, the question of intent should be resolved by the 
trier of fact so as to lead to consistent application of the law. This approach would 
ensure a robust balancing of a speaker’s interest in speech autonomy with the 
listener’s interest in being free from fear caused by threatening speech69 while also 
providing much-needed clarity and modernization to true-threats jurisprudence. 
 
 69. See Alexander Tsesis, Deliberative Democracy, Truth, and Holmesian Social Darwinism, 72 SMU 
L. REV. 495, 510 (2019) (“The task of free speech theory is to articulate the conditions for robust 
debate, cathartic expression, and informative communication, while defining narrowly tailored 
regulations that punish linguistic conduct that is intentionally threatening to individuals and groups 
or inciting of others to harm them.”). 
